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The Minor Parties’ Campaigns
Glenn Kefford
While the return of the Turnbull government with a one-seat majority 
will be the defining story of the 2016 federal election for most political 
observers, equally important is the continued fragmentation of the 
Australian political landscape. Voters are deserting the major parties 
in increasing numbers (Green 2016). Dissatisfaction with Australian 
democracy, at least according to some reports (Evans, Stoker and 
Halupka 2016), is also rising. These conditions provide fertile ground for 
minor parties to work in and the 2016 federal election has shown—as the 
2013 federal election also did—that there are significant opportunities 
for new or even re-energised players at the federal level in Australia. 
The long-term voting trend in both Houses, as shown in Figure 15.1, is 
away from the major parties. In the Senate, split-ticket voting once allowed 
us to explain the number of votes for minor parties and Independents 
(Bowler and Denemark 1993). But this is no longer sufficient. In the 
House, more than 20 per cent of voters gave their first preference to minor 
parties and Independents for the second election in a row, suggesting 
something significant is occurring (for more on Independents see Curtin, 
Chapter 16, this volume). 
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Figure 15.1. Per cent of first preference votes for minor parties 
and Independents
Source . Compiled by author from data kindly provided by Antony Green (2015: 400) 
and the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) (2016a) .
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15 . THE MINOR PARTIES’ CAMPAIGNS
In discussing the performance and outcome of this election for the minor 
parties,1 I begin by placing the result in its historical context and by 
considering what it can tell us about broader trends affecting Australia’s 
minor parties. Following this, I discuss the result for two of the more 
successful minor parties from this election: Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 
(PHON) and the Nick Xenophon Team (NXT). I consider the campaigns 
these parties ran as well as the ideological and organisational dimensions 
of each party.2 I conclude by considering what the 2016 election can tell 
us about Australia’s minor parties.
Australia’s minor parties
In 2002, Ian McAllister wrote: 
placed in a comparative perspective, the hallmark of Australian politics 
is the dominance of party. The vast majority of voters identify with, and 
vote for, one of the major political parties: gaining election at the federal 
level is next to impossible without the benefit of one of the party labels—
Liberal, National or Labor; and minor parties have played little role in 
shaping the development of the party system (2002: 379).
Fourteen years and five federal elections later, this analysis remains only 
partially correct. It is certainly true that the major parties remain dominant 
and, in comparative terms, indicators such as party identification remain 
high (McAllister 2011). Yet, there is also evidence that the strength of 
these ties are weakening and that voters are more open to considering 
options beyond the major parties (Evans, Stoker and Halupka 2016; 
McAllister 2011). 
At the national level, the 2016 result is the third federal election in a row 
in which the share of first preferences for minor parties and Independents 
in both the House and the Senate have increased. In 2013, 21.1 per cent 
of first preferences in the House of Representatives were directed towards 
minor parties and Independents (Green 2016). Results from the 2016 
contest have eclipsed this figure, with 23.4 per cent of first preferences 
in the House being for parties and candidates beyond the major parties 
1  While not discussed in this chapter, debate about what minor parties are has been dealt with 
elsewhere. See Kefford (2017).
2  As this is written shortly after the election, these cases should be taken as exploratory as more 
research and analysis is required.
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(Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) 2016b). The Senate contest in 
2016 was predictably unpredictable. This can be partially explained by 
the halving of the quota required to be elected, as well as to reforms to the 
Senate electoral system, which were legislated in March 2016. In total, 
minor parties and Independents received 35.5 per cent of first preferences 
in the Senate, up from 32.2 per cent in 2013. 
These national-level trends are important and tell us a great deal about 
broader voting behaviour and the opportunities for minor parties. 
Nonetheless, the regional dimension cannot be overlooked. In this sense, 
2016 has seen a revert to type. The minor parties that have done well 
have, with the exception of the Greens, generally performed well to very 
well in one State, while the results in the other States have been far less 
impressive.3 The NXT and PHON results (discussed later) are typical of 
this. They also support the argument put forth by Narelle Miragliotta and 
Campbell Sharman (2012: 590) that subnational success ‘has often been 
a precursor to success at the federal or national level’. The results for NXT 
and PHON also need to be put in some context. When they are compared 
with other federal elections in which minor parties have done well, such as 
1977, 1998 and 2013, they are impressive but not unprecedented. 
When the minor parties that contested the 2016 election are analysed, 
it is evident that there is a significant level of diversity. This is consistent 
with the findings from Dean Jaensch and David Mathieson (1998), who 
classified the 523 minor parties that they discovered were formed between 
1910 and 1996 into 13 classes of parties. Utilising the Jaensch and 
Mathieson typology (1998: 27–28), I classify the 51 minor parties that 
contested the 2016 federal election in Table 15.1. Of these, three have won 
one seat each in the House of Representatives: the Greens in Melbourne, 
NXT in Mayo and Katter’s Australia Party (KAP) in Kennedy. While 
in the Senate, 20 representatives from minor parties have been elected. 
This includes: nine from the Greens, three from NXT, four from PHON 
and one each from the Jacqui Lambie Network (JLN), Derryn Hinch’s 
Justice Party, the Liberal Democrats and Family First. The outcome in the 
Senate means that the number of Senators on the crossbench has reached 
its highest total ever.
3  This is even the case for PHON which won Senate seats across the country, yet the result was 
pronounced in QLD. 
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15 . THE MINOR PARTIES’ CAMPAIGNS
Table 15.1. Minor parties contesting the 2016 federal election
Classification Parties
1 Postmaterial, new 
politics, Green
Sustainable Australia; Animal Justice Party; Australian 
Progressives; Australian Sex Party; Health Australia Party; 
The Greens; Pirate Party; Science Party; Secular Party of Australia
2 Single issues Australian Antipaedophile Party; Australian Cyclists Party; 
australian Equality Party (Marriage); australian Motoring 
Enthusiast Party; Australian Recreational Fishers Party; Drug 
Law Reform Party; Marijuana (HEMP) Party; Non-Custodial 
Parents Party; Renewable Energy Party; The Arts Party; 
Voluntary Euthanasia Party; Consumer Rights & No-Tolls; 
Smokers Rights Party; Bullet Train For Australia; Outdoor 
Recreation Party (Stop The Greens)
3 Religious, moral, 
Christian/humanist
Christian Democratic Party; Citizens Electoral Council; Family 
First; Australian Christians
4 Local, regional N/A
5 Idiosyncratic N/A
6 Personality Glenn Lazarus Team; Derryn hinch’s Justice Party; Jacqui 
Lambie Network; John Madigan’s Manufacturing and Farming 
Party; Katter’s Australian Party; Nick xenophon Team; Palmer 
United Party (PUP); Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON)
7 Frivolous N/A
8 Secessionist DLP – Democratic Labour Party
9 Race, immigration/
antiracism
Australia First Party; Australian Liberty Alliance; Rise Up 
Australia Party
10 Social base Australian Country Party; CountryMinded; Mature Australia 
Party; Seniors United Party of Australia; Shooters, Fishers and 
Farmers; Veterans Party
11 Doctrinal Socialist alliance; Socialist Equality Party
12 ‘New Right’ Liberal Democrats (LDP)
13 Platform parties Online Direct Democracy; VOTEFLUx .ORG
Note . A number of these were not clear cut, so I followed Jaensch and Matheson’s lead 
on some of the classifications. I also made one change: ‘unidentified’ was the final class of 
parties in the original schema, I have replaced this with ‘Platform Party’ .
Source . Compiled by author .
The 2016 contest—like the 2013 contest—shows us that despite the 
opportunities for minor parties, it is still exceptionally difficult to achieve 
federal parliamentary representation. The Greens (Jackson, Chapter 13, 
this volume) stand alone as a minor party that has successfully developed 
from the grassroots. The remainder of the successful minor parties from 
the 2016 election have benefited due to at least one of the following: 
party registration rules being different for members of parliament than for 
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parties started outside parliament, significant name recognition and/or 
good fortune. KAP, JLN and NXT were all able to use the rules permitting 
members of parliament to register political parties without having 
signed up 500 members (as per the rules for those outside parliament) 
to create their own personal parties.4 PHON and Hinch’s Justice Party, 
also personal parties, brought with them significant name recognition. 
For Family First, the Liberal Democrats and PHON, the halving of the 
Senate quotas impacted on who and how many of their candidates were 
elected.5 Meanwhile, Hinch appears to have benefited from being first on 
the ballot in Victoria. What can be said for Australia’s minor parties, then, 
is that the medium-term voting trend provides opportunities. However, 
significant challenges remain in translating this into effective and stable 
constituencies that first lead to election and second to entrenchment 
in the Australian party system.
The return of Pauline Hanson and 
One Nation
While most of the media commentary about the minor parties during the 
campaign period was focused on how well the Greens and NXT would fare, 
the election aftermath was dominated by coverage of Pauline Hanson and 
One Nation. PHON won four Senate seats: two in Queensland (QLD), 
including one for the party’s eponymous leader, one in New South Wales 
(NSW) and one in Western Australia (WA). But this is of course not 
Hanson’s nor One Nation’s first electoral breakthroughs. Hanson was 
first elected to the federal parliament in the House of Representatives in 
1996 in the seat of Oxley. She had been preselected by the Liberal Party, 
but during the campaign was disendorsed as a result of her inflammatory 
comments in a letter she wrote to the Queensland Times newspaper about 
Indigenous Australians. In 1997, with the help of cofounders David 
Oldfield and David Ettridge, Hanson formed PHON. 
4  There are others who used the same rules who were not re-elected. This includes Glenn Lazarus 
and John Madigan. For more on personal parties see Kefford and McDonnell (2016) and McDonnell 
(2013). 
5  There has been analysis conducted that suggests PHON would have won a Senate seat in 
Tasmania if the electoral system had not been changed. However, this appears to be based on a logic 
that the government would have still called a double-dissolution election (see Cassidy 2016). 
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15 . THE MINOR PARTIES’ CAMPAIGNS
Less than a year after its formation, the party did spectacularly well in 
the June 1998 QLD State election, winning over 22 per cent of first 
preferences in the unicameral legislature and 11 seats. When the federal 
election was held in October later that year, however, Hanson failed in 
her bid for re-election after moving to the seat of Blair and the party 
secured only one Senate seat. Since that time, Hanson has contested 
every federal election except 2010. However, this has not always been 
for One Nation.6 She has also stood as an Independent or as a candidate 
for her short-lived Pauline’s United Australia Party. In addition to these 
federal campaigns, Hanson has stood as a candidate in four State elections. 
This includes standing as an Independent in the 2003 and 2011 NSW 
Legislative Council elections, and the 2009 QLD State election in the seat 
of Beaudesert. In 2015, Hanson returned as a candidate for One Nation, 
contesting the QLD State election in the seat of Lockyer.
What should be evident from this is that the relationship between Hanson 
and others involved in the party has not always been easy. The  fate of 
PHON as an electoral force has been largely wedded to that of Hanson 
and, in the nearly 20 years since its formation, most of the significant results 
have been achieved when Hanson has been the leader of the party. In the 
period after the 2001 federal election, up until the 2013 federal election 
when Hanson was not involved with the party, the results were modest 
(Ghazarian 2015: 135–59).7 In this period, the party was dysfunctional; 
splinter groups broke away, some of the remaining parliamentarians left 
to become Independents or joined other parties and the party was even 
deregistered by the AEC.
Prior to the 2016 election, PHON had little in the way of an organisational 
structure and limited resources. In theory, the party is said to have 
a  branch and conference structure (PHON 2015). Candidates for the 
party, however, have suggested there were little if any active members. 
The  party  had a head office in Brisbane and had one paid employee 
(Walker 2016).8 The campaign the party ran was highly decentralised. 
6  At the 2015 QLD State election, the party registered in QLD was called ‘One Nation’, the name 
here and in other States was subsequently changed back to Pauline Hanson’s One Nation following 
this election.
7  In this period, Hanson resigned from the party and then, along with David Ettridge, stood trial 
and was sentenced to prison for fraudulently registering PHON in 1997. See Zareh Ghazarian (2015: 
137–38) and Gary Johns (2006: 61–62).
8  At the time of writing, interviews had been conducted with 15 candidates from multiple States, 
which was part of a different project.
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According to the candidates interviewed, they were given some media 
training, had a one-day meeting in Brisbane with the other candidates 
and then were left to their own devices to do what they could in their 
electorate. The party made it very clear to potential candidates that they 
were unable to provide them with financial support, and this meant 
they even had pay for their own corflutes. According to interviewees, the 
limited financial resources the party did possess came primarily from funds 
that Hanson had to borrow. Candidates therefore needed to self-finance 
their campaigns and the party website advises potential candidates that 
they consider ‘the cost of a decent campaign (without TV advertising) to 
be around $5,000–$10,000 per electorate’ (PHON n.d.).9
The organisational and financial limitations meant the campaign the party 
ran was hard fought but limited in scope. The party relied almost solely 
on social media for the sharing of videos and party-based advertising and 
while the majority of the candidates had social media profiles to try to 
engage with voters, they were basic and their use was inconsistent. All the 
candidates interviewed noted that they were reliant on the goodwill of 
members and supporters in their area as well as their friends and family 
to assist with local campaigning efforts. In addition to these local-level 
campaigns, after the writs for the election were issued on 8 May 2016, 
Hanson began crisscrossing the country to help boost the profile of the 
party’s candidates. These events were usually dubbed, ‘Meet Pauline and 
…’. Most of these and the campaign launches, including those for the 
Senate candidates, were in regional towns. For example, the NSW Senate 
candidate launch was held in Quirindi, while for the Victorian candidates 
it was held in Bendigo. The party also set up other events to attempt 
to capitalise on the appeal of the Hanson story. These included a public 
event on 27 May 2016 in Ipswich to celebrate Hanson’s birthday and, on 
29 May 2016, ‘Fish N Chips with Pauline Hanson’.10 On 3 June 2016, 
the party held its QLD Senate launch. The event, held at the Norman 
Park Bowls Club in Brisbane, generated significant media attention as 
police were required to remove protestors from the venue (Sydney Morning 
Herald 2016).
9  Jamie Walker (2016) suggested that an agreement had been made that candidates who reached 
the 4 per cent required for electoral funding would receive 85 per cent of expenses back. However, 
candidates interviewed said they had not been reimbursed. 
10  PHON has a calendar of events on their website, from where this material is derived. 
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15 . THE MINOR PARTIES’ CAMPAIGNS
In total, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation contested 15 seats in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate contest in all six States. While the results 
are not as strong as they were in 1998 (shown in Table 15.2), party support 
remains robust in a similar set of electorates as it did in 1998—where they 
received in excess of 10 per cent of first preferences in 2016, they also 
achieved this in 1998. In finishing in third position on first preferences in 
11 of the 15 House seats the party contested, they also played a significant 
role in determining who was eventually elected. The average PHON voter 
in 1998, it has been suggested, was likely to reside in ‘rural or regional 
areas, to be male, to be aged over 50, to be poorly educated and to have a 
blue-collar job’ (Bean 2000; Goot and Watson 2001). By the very nature 
of the electorates the party chose to contest in the House, this analysis 
remains at least partially correct.
The impact that the double dissolution had on the number of Senators 
the party had elected is indisputable. Hence, while this is the best result at the 
federal level since 2001, the following factors are worthy of consideration 
in future analysis of the PHON result. First, this was the first federal 
election since 2001 in which Hanson stood as a  candidate for PHON 
in QLD. This is clearly the State where the party is strongest.11 Second, 
QLD is a fertile ground for parties espousing an anti-establishment, anti–
major party sentiment. This is evident when the vote for minor parties 
and Independents in the past three elections are examined. In both 
houses, QLD voters frequently vote for minor parties and Independents at 
numbers higher than the national average. Third, while terrorism became 
an issue late in the election campaign with the attack in Istanbul in Turkey 
on 29 June 2016,12 the salience of this and other issues that PHON focused 
on (such as race and immigration) requires further analysis. If the size of 
the vote for the other minor parties that openly espouse nationalistic and 
anti-migrant sentiment is any indication—and it is tiny—these issues did 
not appear to have a significant impact.13 Moreover, the electorates in 
11  Indeed, in 2004, Hanson stood as an Independent for the Senate in QLD, running against 
the party named after her and received 37,888 first preferences while PHON received 71,043 first 
preferences in total in QLD. While in 2007, Hanson again contested the Senate contest in QLD, this 
time for her Pauline’s United Australia Party, and the party won 101,461 first preferences. However, 
One Nation—which had changed its name—received 4,174 first preferences. The importance of 
Hanson to the party is underscored by these figures.
12  According to Insentia (2016), the terror attack became the second biggest issue covered in the 
media in the week 25 June to 1 July.
13  In the first period of electoral success for PHON, however, Simon Jackman (1998) showed 
how salient these issues were in the electorate and Rachel Gibson, Ian McAllister and Tami Swenson 
(2002) argued that race and immigration policies were key reasons why voters supported PHON. 
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which PHON performed well, PUP also did well in at the 2013 federal 
election. PUP’s policies on refugees and Indigenous Australians, as two 
examples, stand in direct contrast to those of PHON (Palmer United Party 
2013). Hence, there are important and currently unresolved questions in 
regard to what level of PHON’s vote is due to the salience of their policies 
as opposed to the anti–major party sentiment that has been evident in 
Australian federal politics through multiple election cycles.
Table 15.2. One Nation results in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate
Electorate % of First 
Preferences 2016
% of First 
Preferences 1998
Blair, QLD 15 .5 36 .8
Dobell, NSW* 8 .6 9 .5
Fadden, QLD 11 .9 12 .7
Fairfax, QLD* 9 .7 18 .1
Flynn, QLD 17 .1 NA
Herbert, QLD* 13 .5 14 .4
Hinkler, QLD 19 .1 19 .1
Leichhardt, QLD 7 .6 14 .1
Longman, QLD* 9 .4 18 .4
Maranoa, QLD 17 .8 22 .9
Oxley, QLD 8 .4 18 .8
Paterson, NSW* 13 .0 8 .3
Richmond, NSW 6 .2 10 .2
Wide Bay, QLD 15 .6 26 .7
Wright, QLD 20 .9 NA
Senate – QLD 9 .1 14 .8
Senate – NSW 4 .1 9 .6
Senate – Wa 4 .0 10 .4
Senate – SA 2 .9 9 .7
Senate – TAS 2 .5 3 .8
Senate – VIC 1 .8 4 .1
* indicates seats which changed hands 
Source . Compiled by author from AEC (2016c, 2016d) and Paul Reynolds (2000: 163) .
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PHON has long been cited as one of the classic cases of the populist 
radical right. The three key ingredients of populist radical-right ideology 
according to Mudde (2012, 2016) are nativism, authoritarianism and 
populism. The policies that PHON emphasised during the campaign 
were consistent with both their own traditions and that of radical-right 
populists more broadly. This included policies on immigration, refugees, 
Halal certification and Islam. In classic populist terms, the sovereignty of 
the ‘people’ was also asserted. This came in the form of ‘Citizens Initiated 
Referenda’. In outlining the policy, the party criticises what it sees as the 
failings of representative democracy and suggests that what is needed 
is a ‘mechanism to democratically pursue those issues [sic] to produce 
an outcome of legislative change that is actually the will of the people’ 
(PHON 2016d).14
The party’s policy on Islam, which received significant media attention 
during and following the election, calls for ‘an inquiry or Royal Commission 
to determine if Islam is a religion or political ideology’ (PHON 2016c). 
The policy also calls for the prevention of ‘further Muslim Immigration 
and the intake of Muslim refugees’, a ban on ‘the Burqa and Niquab [sic] in 
public places’ and ‘surveillance cameras to be installed in all Mosques and 
schools’ (PHON 2016c). In light of this rhetoric, it is worth considering 
the religious composition of the electorates PHON contested in 2016. 
Here, the evidence is revealing. Of the 15 House of Representatives 
electorates in which the party stood candidates, each had small to very 
small Muslim populations. According to the 2011 Census data, the seat 
of Oxley had the largest Muslim population of the 15, coming in 45th 
of the 150 electorates in the House. While 10 of the electorates PHON 
contested were in the bottom third for size of the Muslim population, 
Richmond, Fisher, Wide Bay and Paterson were all in the bottom 10 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2011).
The centrality of Islam in the rhetoric of PHON during the 2016 election 
campaign should be seen as part of the evolution of who the ‘other’ is 
since the party’s first period of electoral success. Writing shortly after the 
party emerged, Geoff Stokes (2000: 26) said that there were ‘two kinds 
of “other”: those categorised as oppressor or enemy, and those who by 
their very existence are represented as cultural or criminal threats to the 
Australian way of life’. While the latter group was formerly Indigenous 
14  This seems to fit with Cas Mudde’s (2015) argument that populism is ‘an illiberal democratic 
response to undemocratic liberalism’.
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Australians and Asian migrants,15 it has now become Muslim. Hence, 
while the ‘other’ may have changed, nativism remains one of the keys to 
unpacking the ideology of PHON. The ‘oppressor’, in contrast, remains 
political and economic elites who, for PHON, have been acting in 
their own self interest. PHON’s (2016b) economic and tax policy, for 
example, suggests that that party will ‘bring back federalism and restore 
Australia’s constitution so that our economy is run for the benefit of 
Australians, instead of the United Nations and unaccountable foreign 
bodies’. The party’s climate change policy calls for, among other things, 
the abolition of the Renewable Energy Target as: 
climate change has and will continue to be used as a political agenda 
by politicians and self-interest groups or individuals for their own gain. 
We cannot allow scare mongering by people such as Tim Flannery, who 
make outlandish statements and are not held accountable (PHON 2016e).
Anti-elitism, which Barry Hindess and Marian Sawer said was ‘at the heart 
of Pauline Hanson’s political appeal in the mid to late 1990s’ (2004: 1), 
therefore also remains unmistakably central to the party’s discourse.
The election of four PHON Senators will provide institutional and 
financial resources that the party could use to institutionalise themselves. 
The $1.6 million the AEC has paid out to the party in election funding 
will also help (Doran 2016). In the party’s first period of success, it was 
tightly controlled and a common complaint from parliamentarians and 
the party members was that they had no capacity to make meaningful 
contributions (Ghazarian 2015: 134–35). Nicole Bolleyer has shown 
that parties dominated by political entrepreneurs can be transformed 
into a ‘fully institutionalized, self-standing organization’ (2013: 214). 
However, this is dependent on the choices party elites make. For such 
a  transformation to occur, a significant shift in approach from Hanson 
and other party elites would be required.
15  The party’s opposition to policies that they perceive as favouring Indigenous Australians still 
remain. For example, the party website has a list of ‘aims’, which includes ‘to abolish divisive and 
discriminatory policies, such as those related to Aboriginal and Multicultural Affairs’ (PHON 2016a). 
This content downloaded from 
            124.176.36.204 on Wed, 05 Aug 2020 00:47:18 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
347
15 . THE MINOR PARTIES’ CAMPAIGNS
The rise of the Nick Xenophon Team
While in the election aftermath, PHON may have been the minor party 
dominating the headlines, the impact that NXT will have on the 45th 
Parliament as a result of the success they achieved at this election is 
indisputable. NXT secured three Senate seats in South Australia (SA) and 
the seat of Mayo, also in SA, in the House of Representatives. In doing so, 
NXT has positioned itself as a force to be reckoned with in a parliament 
where the numbers in both houses place them in a strong negotiating 
position. The threat NXT posed in the 2016 election is evident when 
the scale of the campaign the major parties ran against the party are 
considered. Senior federal politicians from both the ALP and the Liberal 
Party publicly outlined their opposition to the party and one high-
profile interviewee from NXT suggested that a million dollars had been 
spent by the major parties on negative advertising targeting NXT in SA 
(Starick 2016).16
Xenophon brought considerable name recognition to his party as a result 
of the decade he spent in the South Australian Legislative Council. 
According to Haydon Manning (2007: 8), when Xenophon was elected 
to the Senate in 2007, he made ‘history as the first South Australian 
elected to the Senate as an Independent. With … a remarkable 14.8 per 
cent first preference vote which equated to 1.03 quotas’. As Xenophon’s 
six-year term in the Senate came to an end in 2013, he decided to form 
his own party. He argued, ‘the current federal laws are stacked against 
Independents running for the Senate, which is why there have only been 
a handful of independent senators in 112 years’ (Australian Associated 
Press (AAP) 2013). Registered with the AEC on 1 July that year, The Nick 
Xenophon Group, as it was then called, contested the South Australian 
Senate election with Xenophon and one other candidate, Stirling Griff, 
and the party received 24.8 per cent of first preferences (AEC 2013). 
Yet, despite this strong showing, the party was able to win only one Senate 
seat, with the preference deals of the other parties seen as a key reason for 
why the party failed to secure a second Senate quota.
16  The opposition from both major parties can partially be explained by NXT’s decision to run 
open tickets and not to encourage its supporters to preference one over the other. 
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The 2016 campaign can therefore be seen as a breakthrough election 
for NXT. As is evident from Table 15.3, NXT stood candidates in 18 seats 
in the House of Representatives. In the Senate, the party had 14 candidates 
across the country. In both houses, the primary focus of the party was in SA 
where the party had candidates in each of the 11 House of Representatives 
seats and also had four Senate candidates including the party’s eponymous 
leader, Nick Xenophon. In the South Australian Senate contest, the party 
won 21.7 per cent of first preferences with Xenophon, Griff and Skye 
Kakoschke-Moore elected. The party also received 21.2 per cent of first 
preferences in the House of Representatives across the whole of SA (AEC 
2016a). Results outside SA were less impressive and, in many lower house 
seats in other States, the NXT candidate was running against a high-profile 
opponent. The Senate result in the other States followed this trajectory. 
Table 15.3. The Nick Xenophon Team results in the House 
of Representatives and the Senate
Electorate % of First Preferences
Adelaide, SA 12 .8
Barker, SA 29 .0
Boothby, SA 20 .6
Calare, NSW 5 .4
Grey, SA 27 .7
Groom, QLD 7 .6
Higgins, Vic 2 .2
Hindmarsh, SA 15 .0
Kingston, SA 17 .2
Lindsay, NSW 2 .0
Macarthur, NSW 3 .6
Makin, SA 16 .6
Mayo, SA 34 .8
Moreton, QLD 4 .7
Port Adelaide, SA 18 .7
Sturt, SA 21 .1
Wakefield, Sa 20 .4
Warringah, NSW 6 .3
Senate – QLD 2 .0
Senate – NSW 1 .7
Senate – Wa 2 .1
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Electorate % of First Preferences
Senate – SA 21 .7
Senate – TAS 1 .5
Senate – VIC 1 .5
Source . Compiled by author from AEC (2016c, 2016d) .
Xenophon, who is well-known for his use of stunts to generate media 
exposure, had suggested during the campaign that NXT had a ‘dental 
floss budget’ with which to campaign (Anderson 2015). Like PHON, 
they had one full-time salaried staff member to manage candidate-
related issues. Also, like PHON, candidates were required to fundraise 
or self-finance, and would then be reimbursed depending on the election 
results. According to one high-profile interviewee, the party spent an 
estimated $200,000 outside SA. In addition to this, individual candidates 
interviewed outlined how they had spent thousands of dollars on local 
campaigning. In this regard, one candidate disclosed how they had spent 
$30,000 on their campaign, while another estimated that for them it was 
closer to $50,000.
In contrast to a number of other minor parties, NXT put their candidates 
through a rigorous preselection process. Starting with 450 applications 
initially, the party whittled the numbers down to 90 from which they 
formed Electoral Advisory Committees (EACs) in a number of States 
(Starick 2015; candidate interviews). With input from Xenophon and 
Griff, the EACs assisted in selecting candidates in each of the States, and 
eventually 32 candidates from across Australia were selected (NXT n.d.; 
candidate interviews). With candidate selection completed and the EAC 
in place, planning for the campaign began for most candidates by the end 
of 2015. From March 2016, the party was coordinating multiple ‘Meet 
Nick and the Candidate’ events each week in SA. The candidates outside 
SA were told that Xenophon would make multiple visits to each of the 
other States in the lead-up to, and during, the actual campaign. They 
were also advised that while they could contact the head office in Adelaide 
for support, and they had weekly phone hook-ups, their campaigns were 
still largely up to them.17 According to those interviewed, this meant that 
candidates, and the EACs supporting them, were meant to work out 
17  At the time of writing, 17 semi-structured interviews had been conducted with candidates 
from multiple States as part of a different project. All interviews were conducted on the condition of 
anonymity.
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a way to utilise and engage the members and supporters to help with 
campaigning. Unsurprisingly, for most of the candidates from outside 
SA, this challenge was immense as the number of active EAC members 
declined and they had little help from supporters. 
When asked to describe the party in ideological terms, Xenophon says it 
is in the ‘political centre’ (Grattan 2016). This positioning also extended 
to the advertising the party used with one piece suggesting that the party 
wanted to ‘break the duopoly’ of the major parties. When the policies of 
NXT are analysed, what can be said is that they are largely protectionist 
in nature, with a heavy emphasis on Australian manufacturing and 
government intervention into markets. There is also a strong emphasis 
on infrastructure, improving education and health outcomes, and acting 
on predatory gambling and poker machines. On social issues the party is, 
for the most part, socially progressive. Support for same-sex marriage and 
constitutional recognition for Indigenous Australians are examples of this. 
The obvious historical comparison with NXT is the Democrats. Both 
parties have tried to position themselves as centrists, performed well in 
SA and broad policy comparisons can be made with their socially liberal, 
economically protectionist and interventionist range of policy measures 
(Sugita 1997). The ideological profile of NXT is, therefore, certainly not 
as incoherent as that of PUP (Kefford and McDonnell 2016), but neither 
is it as clear cut as the Greens or PHON.
The inevitable problem for NXT in both organisational and electoral 
terms is that the party is seen first and foremost as an advocate for the 
interests of South Australians. This view appears to have some basis when 
the party constitution is examined (NXT 2014). John Warhurst (2016) 
noted prior to the election that the Australian federal system has never 
really generated a successful State-based regional party compared to 
Canada, as even those parties that have been strong in one State ‘have 
also had wider national aspirations and representation right from the 
beginning’. NXT has the potential to break the mould in this respect. 
Xenophon has previously indicated that he would field candidates in 
the South Australian Legislative Council elections in 2018 and would 
consider whether the party would also contest the House of Assembly 
(Wills 2016). Based on the outcome of the federal election, it appears 
the next logical step for NXT is to entrench themselves further in their 
stronghold of SA by running candidates in both houses in the next State 
election. While the 2016 election can, therefore, be seen as a success for 
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NXT, the challenges for the party are still significant. Not the least of 
these will be how the party will fare in the next federal election when 
Xenophon is not expected to be a candidate.
Conclusion
The nationwide results of the 2016 federal election will be seen as evidence 
that the grounds are fertile for new or existing minor parties in Australia. 
This is for good reason. The evidence certainly shows a trend away from 
the major parties in the medium term and evidence of relatively new or 
resurgent minor parties winning seats in both the House and the Senate. 
This is certainly significant. Nonetheless, the challenges for minor parties 
in Australia cannot be understated. In particular, questions remain 
about the capacity of those minor parties that have been able to achieve 
parliamentary representation to institutionalise. Angelo Panebianco 
articulated the challenge that new parties face when they move from 
a phase ‘in which organizational identity is manifest (the objectives being 
explicit and coherent), to a phase in which the organizational ideology 
is latent (the objectives being vague, implicit, and contradictory)’ (1988: 
18–19). The goals of parties such as NXT and PHON were to turn 
Xenophon and Hanson’s personal popularity and name recognition into 
something larger than themselves. What are the objectives now they have 
achieved this aim? Successfully managing this transition will require party 
elites to clarify what the objectives of the party are, and to think about 
ways to include candidates, members and supporters in party decision-
making. If  this cannot be achieved, these parties may replicate the fate 
of PUP, which faded as quickly as it rose due to party organisation 
mismanagement.
The 2016 federal election is clearly significant for Australia’s minor parties. 
It is the first election fought under a new Senate electoral system since 
1984. However, the government’s decision to use the triggers available 
to it to call a double dissolution means that the impact of these changes 
are yet to be fully understood. As the minor parties can no longer use 
the group-voting tickets to their advantage, it would appear likely that 
the number of parties contesting federal elections in the future are 
likely to shrink. Indeed, as noted in Table 15.1, there are a number of 
similar minor parties who may need to consider merging to improve 
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their competitiveness. Ultimately, the 2016 federal election suggests that 
Australia’s minor parties can be cautiously optimistic about their future 
prospects.
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